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Abstract
It is a widely held opinion that apprenticeship training represents a net investment for
training firms, and that therefore firms only train if they have the possibility to recoup these
investments after the training period. A recent study using a new firm-level dataset for Switzer-
land showed, however, that for 60 percent of the firms, the apprenticeship training itself does
not result in net cost. In this context it seems important to examine the question whether
the potential net cost of training (during the training period) are a major determinant for the
demand for apprentices. Different count data models, in particular hurdle models, are used to
estimate the effect of net cost on the demand for apprentices. The results show that the net cost
have a significant impact on the training decision but no significant influence on the demand for
apprentices, once the firm has decided to train. For policy purposes, these results indicate that
subsidies for firms that already train apprentices would not boost the demand for apprentices.
JEL Classification: J24, C25
Keywords: Apprenticeship training, count data, probit-Poisson-log-normal model, Switzerland
∗The study is based on two surveys financed by the Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI credit 4289.1
BFS and 5630.1 BFS) with the help of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and carried out in tandem with a similar
survey in Germany conducted by the Federal Institute of Vocational Training (Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung) in
Bonn.
1 Introduction
Every year, almost 70,000 or more than half of the Swiss youngsters who complete their compul-
sory schooling choose to embark on what is called the dual education system, that is, a training
programme combining vocational education at school with training in and work for a company.
In order to guarantee each new cohort of school leavers that there is a sufficient number of firms
willing to offer training opportunities, it is important to know which factors affect the demand for
apprentices. From an economic point of view, it seems obvious that a firm would hire the more
apprentices the higher the net benefit of apprenticeship training amounts to. So far, most studies
suggested that apprenticeship training results in net cost during the apprenticeship (e.g. Beicht et
al. 2004). This would imply that companies need to be able to recoup these net cost by employing
graduated apprentices as skilled workers and paying them a wage lower than the value of their
marginal productivity, because otherwise they would not offer an apprenticeship programme.
The most recent study of the Swiss apprenticeship system shows, unlike other studies, that about
two thirds of the training firms find it profitable to train apprentices (Schweri et al. 2003). This
suggests that for the majority of training firms, the possibility to recoup the investment during the
apprenticeship training period is an important factor explaining their availability for training. That
not every single company is able to offer apprenticeship posts under the same favourable conditions
was subsequently pointed out by Wolter et al. (2003), who showed that the potential net cost of
non-training firms would be positive and considerably higher than those of training companies, if
they were to engage in training apprentices. These observations lead to the hypothesis that, at
least in Switzerland where the high flexibility of the labour market puts some restrictions on the
possibilities for firms to recoup training expenses after the training period has ended, the net cost
of training during the training period is a decisive argument in favour or against the training of
apprentices.
This paper extends the analyses made so far in testing directly whether the (potential) net cost
of training during the training period explain the training probability of firms. Furthermore, it is
estimated whether the net cost of training also affect the demand for apprentices, once the decision
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to train has been made. We use different types of count data models to account for the specific
structure underlying the demand for apprentices.
The paper fills a gap in the training literature, as all previous studies (see section 3) estimating
the demand for apprentices with firm-level data were not able to include data on the cost and
benefit of the apprenticeship training in their analyses because of the lack of these data. The only
exception known to the authors is a study by Niederalt et al. (2001), using, however, a very small
and non-representative sample of firms.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses briefly the apprenticeship system in
Switzerland. Section 3 summarizes previous studies and motivates the hypothesis tested in this
paper. Section 4 introduces the data and the sample design. In Section 5, (potential) net cost are
estimated using a maximum likelihood selection model. Then, the effect of net cost on the demand
for apprentices is estimated using different types of count data models. Section 6 concludes.
2 The apprenticeship system in Switzerland
The apprenticeship system is the route chosen by about 60 percent of the Swiss youngsters at upper
secondary level. More than 180,000 adolescents are currently embarked on what is called the dual
education system, that is, a training programme combining vocational education at school with
training in and work for a company. Almost half of the remaining 40 percent of young people who
complete compulsory education go on to attend grammar school (Gymnasium) to prepare them for
university and a more academic career. The remainder opt either for other entirely school-based
forms of education or pursues no form of post-compulsory education, placing Switzerland ahead of
other OECD countries in terms of the percentage of the over-16 population attending any form of
non-compulsory schooling.
Vocational training in a dual-education program usually lasts three to four years. Drop-out rates
were fairly low in the past. Based on the responses of training firms in the survey used for this article,
the drop out rates were on average 5 percent. Apprentices graduate with a diploma recognized
throughout Switzerland attesting that the apprentice has a professional qualification. The quality
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of the training provided in Switzerland, which combines school lessons (1-2 days a week) with
on-the-job training in a firm under the supervision of certified staff, is recognized internationally
as meeting top standards. International comparisons show, in terms of scholastic and professional
qualifications, that Swiss apprentices are more than a match for their upper secondary level peers
attending school full-time (see e.g. Bierhoff and Prais 1997).
The employment period ends automatically on completion of training. Any extension of the
employment period must be negotiated in a separate contract. Switzerland differs in this respect
from some other countries where apprentices are protected from dismissal for a period of time
after completing their training. Mobility is fairly high among young people who complete their
apprenticeship, with only 36 percent still working at their original training site one year on (see
Schweri et al. 2003).1
3 Previous studies
There have been several studies on the demand for apprentices using firm-level data in the last few
years, but most of them did not include data on the cost-benefit ratio of apprenticeship training on
the firm-level. Some of the studies described below used proxies for the cost-benefit ratio instead,
others have simply ignored this possibility.
Harhoff and Kane (1997) found for Germany that “firms are much more willing to train when
there are fewer firms around to poach their trainees” (p.184). They also showed that firms are
less likely to train or train less apprentices if the work force in counties, or counties in commuting
distance, is large.
Neuba¨umer and Bellmann (1999) also examined German firms without data on cost and benefit.
Their data set contained, however, qualitative assessments by the non-training firms of the factors
affecting the training decision. Their findings were, that about two thirds of the firms do not
train because they do not meet the legal requirements for offering apprenticeship training. For
1In Germany, the corresponding figure is closer to 50 percent, see Winkelmann (1996) and Euwals and Winkelmann
(2002).
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the remaining third of the non-training companies, an unfavourable cost-benefit ratio was one of
the main reasons not to train. Further, the analysis of the training intensity of training firms
showed that the firm size is the major factor explaining the ratio of apprentices and total number
of employees. Similar to Switzerland, the majority of all apprentices in Germany are trained by
small firms with less than 50 employees. Wolter and Schweri (2002) found similar results for the
training intensity amongst training firms in Switzerland, but in addition, the net cost of training
also had a significant impact, even if other factors like the firmsize or the training profession were
accounted for.2 This result goes in line with the observation made by Neuba¨umer and Bellmann
(1999) that the training intensity was particularly high in industries where previous studies (see
Bardeleben et al. 1995) had shown low or even negative net costs for apprentices.3
Sto¨ger and Winter-Ebmer (2001) found that the number of apprentices trained in Austria
declined over time, but they were not able to find explanations for this time-trend. As in Germany
and Switzerland, they observed that large firms are more likely to train apprentices, but the intensity
of training is the highest for small firms.
In a different type of analysis, Fouge`re and Schwerdt (2002), comparing the French and the
German apprenticeship system, analysed the determinants of firms’ demand for apprentices. Using
a production function approach, they found evidence that apprentices participate significantly in
the production process only in medium size firms. They conclude from this result, that small and
large firms train apprentices less for the motive of exploiting the value of their productivity, but
rather because of their difficulty to find skilled workers on the external labour market.
Beckmann (2002) finally used a zero-inflated negative binominal model to test the implications
of the theory proposed by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a, 1999b) for firms from West and
East Germany. He defined two regimes, one where firms will never train apprentices, and a second
regime, in which firms can both train zero or a positive number of apprentices. He found evidence
that a high degree of estimated wage compression encourages firms to train apprentices. His findings
2Niederalt et al. (2001) found similar results for a small sample of 27 Bavarian companies for which they had
calculated the cost of apprenticeship training.
3An assessment of the German situation was repeated in an analysis made by Dietrich (2000).
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apply only for companies for which he assumed positive net costs of apprenticeship training, as he
excluded firms from his sample for which he assumed zero or negative net cost of training (companies
with less than five employees). Such a reduction of the sample of analysed firms is in our view
inappropriate to analyse the overall decision of firms to train apprentices, both in Germany and
Switzerland. Furthermore, with the data used in this study, such assumptions are not necessary as
the net cost of training can be included directly in the estimation of the demand for apprentices.
4 Data
The data used here is from two representative surveys conducted in Swiss firms in the year 2001
by the Centre for Research in Economics of Education at the University of Berne and the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office (see Schweri et al, 2003 or Wolter and Schweri 2002). In one survey,
training firms were asked about their cost and benefit of apprenticeship training. In the second
survey, non-training firms were asked to fill in the identical questionnaire as training firms, but
without the questions directly related to the costs and benefits of training.
The original dataset contains 2352 training firms and 2230 non-training firms, but the public
sector has been excluded, because the profit-maximizing principle does not fully apply to such firms.
Also excluded are firms that cannot make independent decisions about training because they are
part of a larger enterprise. The dataset used in this paper embraces 1971 training firms and 1661
non-training firms. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables.
— Table 1 —
For training firms, net cost, i.e. cost minus benefits, were derived as follows: the main parts of
cost are the wages of apprentices and the cost for the training personnel, which together add up
to about 90 percent of total cost. The remainder are cost for material, infrastructure and other.
The benefits are calculated by the type of work the apprentices perform. This benefit is broken
down into production activities that would otherwise be performed by unskilled workers or skilled
workers. While we can assume in the first case that the apprentice’s performance has the same
value as that of an unskilled worker, for the second case the value of the apprentice’s performance
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is compared to that of a fully trained skilled worker.4 Figure 1 shows the distribution of net cost
for the 1971 training firms. The average is negative (benefits exceed costs) at CHF -6,174. Net
cost are negative for 60 percent of all training firms.
5 Econometric models and empirical analysis
In order to estimate the effect of net cost of training on the training decision, we require the
potential net cost for currently non-training firms, which we naturally cannot observe. Hence,
we need to estimate these counterfactual costs, and the first subsection shows how to do that.
In the next subsection, we present different count data models that can be used to estimate the
effect of predicted net cost on the demand for apprentices. A particular feature of the data is the
high proportion of zeros, i.e., the large fraction of non-training firms. In a demand context, these
observations represent a corner solution. Therefore, we concentrate on count data models for corner
solutions, so-called “hurdle models”. A useful property of these models in the present context is
that they allow us to distinguish between cost elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins.
The third subsection presents the results.
5.1 Estimation of potential net cost
The net cost of training are observed only for training firms. To use these costs to estimate the
potential cost of training for currently non-training firms, we have to realize that training firms
are not a random sample from the universe of all firms, and that training and non-training firms
may differ systematically in observable and unobservable characteristics. In order to account for
observable differences, we use a linear regression framework according to which
y1j = x′1jβ1 + ε1j j = 1, . . . , 3632 (1)
where y1j are net cost and x1j is a vector containing variables concerning firm size, number of
skilled workers, industry, apprenticeship profession, region, ownership of the firm and a variable
4For more details on the cost and benefit model used in this study see Wolter et al. (2003) or Schweri et al. (2003).
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indicating whether a firm would like to reduce the time an apprentice spends in vocational school.5
We don’t estimate a log-linear model because net cost can be positive as well as negative. If βˆ1
is a consistent estimator for β1, we can predict the net cost for non-training firms consistently as
yˆnt1j = x
nt′
1j βˆ1.
However, direct estimation of (1) by ordinary least squares using training firms only leads to
selection bias as long as training and non-training firms differ in unobservables as well observables.
Let
y2j =

1 if firm j trains
0 if firm j does not train
(2)
Selection bias arises if E(ε1j |y2j = 1) 6= E(ε1j |y2j = 0). We follow here the standard Heckman
formulation with a latent continuous variable for the training decision:
y2j = 1 [x′2jβ2 + ε2j < 0] (3)
This is a reduced form version of the firms’ profit maximization condition, according to which
firms train as long as the marginal benefit of doing so is positive. The benefit of training has two
components. First, an immediate benefit arises if the net cost of training are negative. Secondly,
a benefit can arise in later periods, for example because the firm needs skilled workers and it may
be difficult to recruit such workers in the outside labour market. This reasoning implies that x2j
should include all determinants of net cost x1j . These variables obviously affect the decision to
train, although not necessarily through their influence on net cost only. They may also have an
indirect effect, by affecting other aspects of the training decision. In addition x2j includes a variable
measuring the tightness of the labor market for skilled workers (the exclusion restriction). This
variable, a dummy indicating whether a firm has difficulties finding skilled workers on the labour
market, does not influence the net cost of the apprenticeship training but it is expected to have a
significant impact on the firm’s decision to train when the net cost of the apprenticeship training
alone would be positive.
5The last variable will be used later on to identify the cost elasticity in a structural demand model. It is assumed
to affect demand only through net cost.
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If we moreover assume that
(ε1j , ε2j) ∼ Normal
0,
 σ21 σ12
σ12 1

 (4)
we obtain that
E(y1j |x1j , x2j , y2j = 1) = x′1jβ1 − σ12
φ(x′2jβ2)
Φ(x′2jβ2)
(5)
for training firms, and
E(y1j |x1j , x2j , y2j = 0) = x′1jβ1 + σ12
φ(x′2jβ2)
1− Φ(x′2jβ2)
(6)
for non-training firms, where σ12 denotes the covariance between the error in the net cost equation
and the error in the training equation. If ρ = σ12/σ1 6= 0, then the expected value of the error term
is E(ε1j |x1j , y2j = 1) 6= 0, and the self-selection problem results in biased estimates in the standard
regression using training firms only. A positive ρ implies that the higher the unobserved net cost
component ε1j , the less likely is the training condition (3) satisfied, i.e., the lower the probability
of training. The net cost of training firms then underestimate the average net cost, as seen in (5).
To solve the problem, a maximum likelihood estimation procedure can be applied, where the
contribution of firm j to the log likelihood function (see Wooldridge 2002) is
Lj = (1− y2j) ln[1− Φ(x′2jβ2)]
+y2j
lnΦ
x′2jβ2 + σ12σ−21 (y1j − x′1jβ1)√
1− σ212σ−21
+ lnφ(y1j − x′1jβ1
σ1
)
− ln(σ1)

The estimation results are given in Table 2. The estimated ρ is positive indeed, so that training
firms self-select based on absolute cost advantage. The point estimate is 0.5, and a Wald test for
the null hypothesis H0 : ρ = 0 has a p-value of 0.0013, so that the null is rejected. If we use the
selectivity-corrected net cost estimates in column 1 of Table 2, we find that the predicted net cost
of an average apprenticeship program of a randomly drawn firm in Switzerland amounts to about
CHF 13,608. 6
6These results differ from the results in Wolter et al. (2003) because in this paper no weights are used. The use
of weights is not required to obtain consistent estimates of the regression parameters although differences in small
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— Table 2 —
Of course, there is considerable variation across firms, as seen in Figure 2 which shows a his-
togram of the predicted net cost of training and non-training firms. The predictions are now based
on (1) and thus conditional on x1j but unconditional on the training decision. As expected, pre-
dicted net cost tend to be higher for non-training firms than for training firms - the averages are
CHF 18,540 and CHF 9,453, respectively. However, there is considerable overlap in the two distri-
butions. 5.45 percent of all non-training firms (about 8,090 firms), are predicted to have negative
net cost and still do not train. At the point of time of the survey some 5,000 offered training posts
were not filled because of a lack of either no or not appropriate applicants. Therefore we suppose
that more than half of these non-training firms with negative net cost did not train because of this
reason. The rest of these firms – according to the model, must have a positive unobserved cost
component.
In the following analysis, the predicted net cost – unconditional on the training decision – are
used as an explanatory variable in a structural model in order to estimate the cost elasticity of the
demand for apprentices. Since the dependent variable, the number of apprentices, is a count, we
discuss first appropriate econometric models for non-negative integer valued random variables.
5.2 Count data models for demand of apprentices
Let nj = 0, 1, 2, . . . denote the number of apprentices employed by firm j and remember that yˆ1j
are the predicted net cost (these can be both positive or negative). The main objects of interest
are the cost elasticity of demand for apprentices at the extensive margin
η1 =
∂P (nj > 0)
∂yˆ1j
yˆ1j
P (nj > 0)
,
and the cost elasticity at the intensive margin
η2 =
∂E(nj |nj > 0)
∂yˆ1j
yˆ1j
E(nj |nj > 0) .
samples occur. From a qualitative point of view, the results remain the same with or without the use of weights. The
weights have been dropped since some of the following count data models have not been implemented for use with
weights.
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Since E(nj) = P (nj > 0)E(nj |nj > 0) it follows that the overall cost elasticity equals η1 + η2.
We will estimate these elasticities from count data models since nj is a non negative integer. The
Poisson regression model, for example, postulates that
P (nj |λj) =
exp(−λj)nλjj
nj !
where
λj = exp(x′jδ + γyˆ1j)
In this case, P (nj > 0) = 1− exp(−λj) and
η1 =
(
λj exp(−λj)
1− exp(−λj)
)
γyˆ1j
Similarly, E(nj |nj > 0) = λj/(1− exp(−λj)) so that
η2 =
(
1− λj exp(−λj)
1− exp(−λj)
)
γyˆ1j
We see immediately that η2 = γyˆ1j − η1. This tight functional relationship between η1 and η2 is
a direct consequence of the assumption that the same distributional model (and the same set of
parameters) generates zeros and positive counts. This assumption needs to be relaxed if one wants
to test separately for the statistical significance of intrinsic and extrinsic cost elasticities – as we
do. The econometric tools that allows one to perform such separate tests are the class of so-called
hurdle models (Mullahy, 1986).
A hurdle model combines a binary model for the training decision with a truncated-at-one count
data model for the number of apprentices employed by training firms. A reduced form binary
training decision was already modelled before, in equation (3). In keeping with the previous model
assumptions, the “structural” training decision equation is again of a standard probit form, this
time including the predicted net cost yˆ1j . In order to capture the indirect effect of the exogenous
variables on the training decision, they are included separately, although one exclusion restriction
is needed for identification. We assume that the regressors x3j are the same as x2j except that the
variable “reduction in vocational school time is desired (yes/no)” is excluded.
10
The probability function of the counts is then
P (nj |x3j , yˆ1j) =

1− Φ(x′3jδ1 + γ1yˆ1j) nj = 0
Φ(x′3jδ1 + γ1yˆ1j)
f(nj |x3j , yˆ1j)
1− f(0|x3j , yˆ1j) nj = 1, 2, . . .
(7)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Here, f(nj)
can be any proper conditional distribution model for count data. The most prominent examples
are the Poisson distribution and the negative binomial distribution (Winkelmann, 2003). Among
these two, the negative binomial model is usually prefered (and the Poisson model is rejected by
formal tests) because it allows for unobserved heterogeneity that is an important feature of almost
all economic data. Assume that
λj = exp(x′3jδ2 + γ2yˆ1j + uj) (8)
where exp(uj) is gamma distributed independently of x3j and yˆ1j . If nj |uj is Poisson distributed,
then the unconditional model nj can be shown to be negative binomial.
However, it has been argued elsewhere (Winkelmann, 2004) that a more suitable model for
incorporating unobserved heterogeneity is the Poisson log-normal model. This model assumes
that conditional on uj , nj is Poisson distributed with parameter λj defined as in (8). Moreover,
uj ∼ Normal(0, σ2u). In previous empirical applications, the Poisson log-normal model usually
outperformed the negative binomial model based on selection criteria for non-nested models. If the
Poisson log-normal model is combined with a probit hurdle as in (7), we obtain the probit-Poisson-
log-normal model (PPLN) with individual likelihood contribution
f(nj) = [1− Φ(x′3jδ1 + γ1yˆ1j)]1 (nj=0) (9)
×
[
Φ(x′3jδ1 + γ1yˆ1j)
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−λj(uj))(λj(uj))nj
[1− exp(−λj(uj))]nj !
1
σu
φ(uj/σu)duj
]11(nj>0)
where φ denoted the standard normal density. The parameters δ1, δ2, γ1, γ2 and σ2u can be jointly
estimated by maximum likelihood. A useful property of all standard hurdle models is that the
log-likelihood function has two additive parts L1(δ1, γ1) and L2(δ2, γ2, σ2u) that can be maximized
separately with respect to the corresponding parameters. In the probit Poisson log-normal model
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described here, δˆ1 and γˆ1 are obtained from estimating a probit model with all data whereas the
remaining parameters are obtained by maximizing a truncated-at-zero Poisson log-normal model
using observations on training firms only. Although the integral in this second part has no analytical
solution and thus requires numerical integration, this can be readily done using the Gauss-Hermite
method.7
We can now return to the question of the elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins.
For the extensive margin, the cost elasticity is readily calculated as
η1 =
φ(x′3jδ1 + γ1yˆ1j)
Φ(x′3jδ1 + γ1yˆ1j)
γ1yˆ1j
The demand elasticity for training firms cannot be calculated in closed form. However, it can be
computed numerically.
5.3 Results
We will concentrate our discussion on the estimation results for the PPLN model. We also estimated
a number of alternative available count data models, as mentioned earlier. Specification tests
showed that the PPLN model fits the data best. First, the Poisson model has a log-likelihood of
-8899.9, compared to a log-likelihood of -5426.7 of the negative binomial model. The two models
are nested with one restriction, and a likelihood ratio test therefore clearly rejects the Poisson
assumption of no unobserved heterogeneity. Next, the simple negative binomial model was tested
against the negative binomial model with hurdle (log-likelihood -5332.7). With 31 restrictions, the
likelihood ratio test statistic has a p-value of zero. This result means that in this application, it
is important to estimate the parameters for the training decision separately from those for the
quantity decision among training firms. Different mechanisms are at work, and imposing a single
probability model for both extensive and intensive margins would lead to spurious interpretations.
After we settled for hurdle models, we finally compared the negative binomial model with hurdle
7An extension of the model allows for correlation between uj and the error in the probit part of the model, leading
to the Probit Poisson-log-normal model with correlated errors (Winkelmann, 2004). In this case, the log-likelihood
function can no longer be maximized separately.
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and the PPLN. The two models are not nested. However, since the log-likelihood of the PPLN is
-5262.1, and since it has one parameter less than the negative binomial hurdle model, it is clearly
the better fitting hurdle model.
— Table 3 —
Table 3 shows all regression coefficients for the PPLN model. The first column gives the probit
coefficients, whereas the third column shows the coefficients for the truncated-at-zero Poisson log-
normal model. The main parameter of interest is the structural effect of net cost. The regression
parameter is negative and statistically significant in the hurdle part but practically zero for the
positives. This means that an increase in net cost reduces the probability of offering (any) training,
but such an increase is unrelated to the number of apprentices a firm trains, once it has decided
to train. A potential economic explanation for this pattern is that small firms who train a small
number of apprentices have in general lower net cost of training than large firms training many
apprentices. Although training is lucrative for small firms, their demand for apprentices is limited
by an upper bound that depends on the number of skilled workers able to train apprentices. If
they would extend their demand beyond that limit, the additional need for trainers (and additional
infrastructure) would result in positive marginal net cost for an additional apprentice. Large firms
with positive net cost of training are not sensitive to marginal variations, because the number of
apprentices is determined by the number of future vacancies for skilled workers. In this situation, a
reduction in the net cost of training would only translate into an additional demand for apprentices
if the marginal net cost of training were smaller than the marginal benefit for the period after
the apprenticeship. The latter depends on the probability that the firm is able to offer its former
apprentice a job. This together leads to the result that once a firm has decided to train apprentices,
the number of apprentices does not depend on marginal variations in the net costs of training. The
effect of net cost is therefore entirely restricted to the extensive margin.
To put a quantitative meaning on the estimated coefficient of -0.044, we can compute the elas-
ticity at the average values of the regressors. In this case, ηˆ1 = −0.45 - a one percent increase in
the net cost reduces the probability of training by 0.45 percent. Obviously, these marginal elastic-
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ities should not be extrapolated too far, as the probit model is highly non-linear. Alternatively,
we can consider absolute percentage point changes in the probability of training. For example,
starting again from average values, an increase in net training cost by one thousand will reduce the
probability of training by 1.8 percentage points. Similarly, an increase in net training cost by one
standard deviation reduces the probability of training by 27.4 percentage points.
In order to summarize the main result of the analysis, we find that the elasticity at the intensive
margin is zero, whereas the estimated elasticity at the extensive margin amounts to -0.45, an
economically substantial effect. We conclude by mentioning some of the other results. Firm size,
measured by the number of employees, and the number of skilled workers have the expexted positive
effects on both the probability of training and on the number of apprentices among training firms.
Foreign owned firms are less likely to train, as are firms in the French speaking part of Switzerland.
The training firms in the French part in addition train fewer apprentices – for given firm size, net
cost, etc.– than otherwise similar firms in the German speaking part of Switzerland. These results
largely confirm those from previous studies.
5.4 A simulation for subsidies
In the year 2000, the year of reference of our survey, about 74’500 new apprentices were employed
by Swiss firms, but not every school leaver interested in apprenticeship training was able to find a
training position. In subsequent years, the gap between the number of school leavers interested in
apprenticeship training and the number of available apprenticeship positions increased steadily due
to the unfavorable general economic climate. Political initiatives tried to fight the imbalance in the
apprenticeship market with the idea of subsidizing firms for their training. Taking into account our
findings, the subsidy should be given to non-training firms, where it would have a large effect, but
not to training firms, where it would have no effect at all. A cost subsidy to a non-training firm
would reduce net cost of training and thereby increase the probability to offer a training position.
The question remains how much such a program would cost.
In the year 2004, according to the ”Lehrstellenbarometer 2004”, some 8,000 interested school
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leavers did not succeed in finding a training position. With an average of 1.04 newly created
apprenticeship posts per training firm, one would need to attract 7,666 new training firms, an
increase in the proportion of training firms by 3.66 percentage points. As shown in the previous
section, the training ratio increases by 1.8 percentage points for each reduction in cost by CHF
1,000. Thus, the targeted increase by 3.66 percentage points requires a subsidy of CHF 1,949 per
apprentice.
Of course, it would be difficult in practice to assess whether a given firm would have offered no
training post in the absence of a subsidy, and thus to discriminate between firms who do already
train apprentices and new firms when deciding whom to offer the training subsidies. In the spirit
of our model, one would need to have detailed information on the net cost of training for that firm.
However, firms can be expected to respond strategically and overstate their true cost once such a
scheme would be in place. Therefore all known political initiatives demanding subsidies for training
start with the idea that each training post would be subsidized, and not only the “additional” ones.
This windfall gain for “old” training companies creates as a consequence much higher total costs of
the subsidy than a regime that could be targeted at the new companies only. As a consequence the
subsidies alone would amount to more than CHF 17,000 per newly created apprenticeship position.
— Table 4 —
The amount depends on the number of newly created apprenticeship positions but is basically
driven by the total number of training firms. To illustrate this, a scenario with an additional
1,000 and another scenario with 10,000 additional new apprenticeship positions is shown in Table
4. To the costs of subsidies, the costs of school for an apprentice must be added, which amount on
average to CHF 15,000 per year. The total cost of education (subsidy included) of an additionally
trained apprentice would be more than CHF 60,000. For purposes of comparison, the total costs
for the highest form of a full-time general education in Switzerland (Gymnasium) are on average
CHF 58,500 for a 3-year period. Taking into account that the administration of such subsidies
would generate additional costs of 10 to 20 percent of the total amount of subsidies, the “artificial”
creation of new apprenticeship positions through subsidies seems already questionable from a cost
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point of view.
6 Concluding remarks
The paper has made both a methodological and a substantive contribution. On the methodological
side, it is the first time that the firm’s demand for apprentices is modelled in a structural framework.
In this empirical framework, the main parameter of interest, the cost elasticity of demand, can be
identified from observing cost data for training firms alone. The problem that costs cannot be
observed for non-training firms is overcome by using predictions from a selectivity corrected cost
equation. A hurdle count data model is then used to estimate the structural demand equation,
so that cost elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins can be estimated separately. To
estimate the model, we employed a unique firm-level dataset that includes training and currently
non-training firms and provides detailed cost information for training firms.
The results are quite striking. We find that the cost elasticity at the extensive margin, i.e.
with regards to the probability whether to train or not to train, amounts to -0.45, an economically
substantial effect. By contrast, the cost elasticity at the intensive margin, i.e. for the number of
apprentices among training firms, is zero.
We close with the substantive conclusion that in order to increase the demand for apprentices,
i.e. the number of apprenticeship positions offered each year, one would need to direct subsidies
at non-training firms and exclude training firms. In this case, the required subsidy would be quite
modest. If, however, such a discrimination is politically and practically infeasible, the costs for
creating additional apprenticeship positions would be prohibitively high.
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Tables
Table 1: Sample descriptives
(N=3632; sampling weights have been used.)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Training firm 0.291 0.454
Number of apprentices 0.675 3.878
Firm size 1-3 0.331 0.471
Firm size 4-9 0.403 0.491
Firm size 10-49 0.224 0.417
Firm size 50-99 0.023 0.151
Firm size >100 0.019 0.135
ln (Number of skilled workers) 0.313 3.035
Sector: Service 0.679 0.467
Industry 0.136 0.343
Construction 0.119 0.324
German part of Switzerland 0.750 0.433
French part of Switzerland 0.222 0.416
Italian part of Switzerland 0.029 0.167
Foreign firm ownership 0.116 0.320
Difficulties in finding qualified labor 0.403 0.491
Reduction in school days 0.113 0.317
Commercial employee 0.177 0.381
Polymechanics technician 0.019 0.136
IT specialist 0.028 0.164
Cook 0.070 0.255
Electromechanics technician 0.020 0.139
Mason 0.025 0.157
Architectural draftsperson 0.030 0.171
Salesperson (2 years) 0.062 0.242
Salesperson (3 years) 0.026 0.159
Auto mechanic 0.020 0.141
Carpenter 0.025 0.155
Office worker 0.033 0.180
Assistant in a doctor’s office 0.021 0.145
Structural draftsperson 0.010 0.100
Hairdresser 0.017 0.129
Automation technician 0.004 0.063
Electronics technician 0.004 0.064
Other professions 0.409 0.492
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Table 2: MLE selection model, Dependent variable: Net cost of training
Net Cost Training yes/no
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Industrial sector -1510.6 (2687.3) 0.145† (0.066)
Construction sector -7799.4† (3579.8) 0.329† (0.087)
French part of Switzerland 1733.4 (2580.1) -0.240† (0.060)
Italian part of Switzerland 8479.1 (5750.7) 0.044 (0.144)
Profession:
Commercial employee -12184.5† (2705.4) -0.162† (0.065)
Electromechanics technician -50675.5† (6150.5) 0.101 (0.174)
Polymechanics technician 24259.5† (4781.7) -0.380† (0.135)
Cook 6976.6 (5686.0) -0.918 (0.136)
IT specialist 10968.9 (5764.4) -0.508† (0.138)
Mason -8595.4 (6289.2) -0.653† (0.168)
Architectural draftsperson -17458.1† (5779.9) 0.542† (0.136)
Salesperson (2 year) -4930.8 (5735.7) -0.874 (0.133)
Salesperson (3 year) -7171.0 (7296.3) 0.208 (0.178)
Carpenter -22790.2† (6462.1) 0.377† (0.175)
Auto mechanic 4007.9 (7396.1) 0.199 (0.184)
Hairdresser -25836.7† (7627.9) 1.051† (0.201)
Office worker -5755.4 (7861.2) -0.421† (0.154)
Assistant in a doctor’s office -10143.9 (7498.6) 0.506* (0.163)
Automation technician 20615.2† (7777.4) 0.574† (0.293)
Electronics technician 24008.1† (8739.7) -0.190 (0.264)
Structural draftsperson -34250.5† (7904.6) 0.725† (0.232)
Firm-characteristics:
Foreign-owned company 5617.6 (3212.0) -0.615† (0.074)
Firm size: 4-9 employees -3631.6 (3561.6) 0.168† (0.069)
Firm size: 10-49 employees -6742.8 (4148.2) 0.362† (0.085)
Firm size: 50-100 employees -8341.6 (5029.0) 0.862† (0.109)
Firm size: >100 employees -4287.8 (5499.7) 1.104† (0.121)
Reduction in school days 8327.6† (3753.6) -0.368† (0.082)
Number of skilled workers (ln) -2498.7† (1095.1) 0.317† (0.031)
Difficulties in finding qualified labor 0.303† (0.049)
Constant 24676.6 (5606.5) -0.732 (0.066)
ρ 0.503 (0.079)
σ1 42580.8 (1152.2)
Log-Likelihood -25551.2
Observations 1971 3632
†Effect is significant at the 5 percent level. The reference site is a Swiss-owned company located
in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, has more than 100 employees, and trains apprentices
in the category “Other occupations” in the service sector.
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Table 3: Demand for apprentices – Probit Poisson log-normal model
Structural Probit Poisson log-normal
(training yes/no) (# apprentices 1+)
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Industrial sector 0.072 (0.067) -0.061 (0.063)
Construction sector -0.013 (0.116) -0.111 (0.118)
French part of Switzerland -0.150† (0.062) -0.465† (0.067)
Italian part of Switzerland 0.374† (0.169) -0.371† (0.156)
Profession:
Commercial employee -0.723† (0.134) -0.263† (0.129)
Polymechanics technician 0.667† (0.280) 0.288 (0.250)
IT specialist -0.056 (0.176) -0.096 (0.153)
Cook 0.222 (0.153) 0.101 (0.150)
Electromechanics technician -2.161† (0.533) 1.016† (0.492)
Mason -1.032† (0.190) -0.168 (0.157)
Architectural draftsperson -0.252 (0.216) -0.140 (0.246)
Salesperson (2 year) -0.305† (0.141) 0.086 (0.144)
Auto mechanic 0.390† (0.189) 0.648† (0.157)
Carpenter -0.635† (0.286) 0.214 (0.265)
Salesperson (3 year) -0.106 (0.190) 0.208 (0.180)
Office worker -0.673† (0.163) -0.866† (0.311)
Assistant in a doctor’s office 0.053 (0.190) -0.019 (0.291)
Structural draftsperson -0.808† (0.407) 0.127 (0.377)
Hairdresser -0.065 (0.324) 0.886† (0.305)
Automation technician 1.457† (0.368) 0.576† (0.247)
Electronics technician 0.877† (0.353) 0.365 (0.275)
Firm-characteristics:
Foreign-owned company -0.373† (0.091) -0.044 (0.080)
Firm size: 4-9 employees 0.013 (0.078) 0.081 (0.133)
Firm size: 10-49 employees 0.063 (0.109) 0.346† (0.149)
Firm size: 50-100 employees 0.500† (0.137) 0.496† (0.161)
Firm size: >100 employees 0.919† (0.129) 0.823† (0.152)
Number of skilled workers (ln) 0.208† (0.040) 0.522† (0.033)
Difficulties in finding qualified workers 0.291† (0.050) 0.080 (0.049)
Net cost of training (in thousands) -0.044† (0.010) 0.001 (0.009)
Constant 0.366 (0.259) -0.857 (0.269)
ln(σu) -0.589† (0.036)
Log-Likelihood -5262.1
Observations 3632 1971
†Effect is significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 4: Subsidy simulation
New apprenticeship Total cost of Subsidy per newly Total cost per
positions subsidies created apprenticeship apprenticeship
(in Mio CHF) position (in CHF) position (in CHF)
8,000 139.7 17,463 62,463
1,000 15.8 15,758 60,758
10,000 179.5 17,950 62,950
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